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I. Introduction, Outline, and Making Up for the Lack
of Hypothesis Testing
Bergin and Lin pick up a venerable distinction that, poorly represented
with disaggregated trade data now accessible, has become the dernier
cri of trade theory. The general issue of the new literature is what influ-
ences the division into intensive and extensive margin of the growth of
a country’s share in the global exports going to another country. The
specific issue raised in a subset of papers like the one here that is of
interest is how, and then why, that division is influenced by the ex-
change rate regime between pairs of countries.
This comment first conveys the essence of the historical distinction
and then shows how the data currently used fail to reflect that distinc-
tion. This raises the question of what a contemporary implementation
of the classical concept, largely preserved in Bergin and Lin’s model but
not in its empirical implementation, could imply. It then discusses the
absence of substantial uncertainty about future real exchange rates in
the model, which detracts from the paper’s main theme. Other aspects
that are crucial to the industrial organization of cross‐border trade, such
as foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in components, also are
missing from the model. This makes it difficult to test hypotheses with
it or to account for its findings.
One crude validation test could be to check on the growth of trade
shares for Canada and Mexico with the United States since the Canada‐
U.S. Free Trade Agreement 1988 or the NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement) 1994 and examine how this growth has been divided
betweentheextensiveandintensivemargins.Myhunchisthatthe expan-
sion of the bilateral trade shares of these countries is about as large and as
concentrated at the extensive margin as Bergin and Lin estimated for
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countries have beenfloatingagainst eachother,and real exchangerates
have swung widely between them since 1994.
II. The Classical Definition of Expanding Trade at Extensive
and Intensive Margins
For over 2 centuries, international trade has been rated as beneficial
whether expanded at its intensive or extensive margins but for different
reasons. The benefits on the intensive margin stem from getting more for
producing exportable goods than available in exchange for other goods
produced under autarky. Exploiting this margin to raise real income was
thesubjectofthetheoryofcomparativeadvantage.Theextensivemargin
refers to the benefits of enjoying new goods not produced, and perhaps
still too expensive to produce, at home, after the technique for doing so
has been learned.
Setting the terms of exchange for such natural monopoly goods poses
specialchallenges.Thedifficultyisthatforthemthereisnobracketonthe
equilibriumtermsof tradethat iscreated byinternalrelative production‐
cost conditions in each of the partnercountries, as under incomplete spe-
cialization. Classical economists referred to the sagas of the salt, spice,
and silk trades, however, to point out that any increase in a unique im-
ported “variety” that a country chooses to enjoy on any terms would
havetobeatleastsomewhatbeneficial.Variatiodelectat,thoughnotwith-
out limit: we now have theories of habit goods and rational inattention
that explain what to fall back on when variety gets bewildering and the
choices too many and complex to think through.
Classical economists’ discussions of international trade thus invari-
ably emphasized two benefits: (1) increased abundance and real income
through improvement in the terms of exchange for one’se x p o r t a b l e
output compared with autarky, and (2) greater variety than available
under autarky producing hedonic gain.
Adam Smith assigned several different functions to trade, such as pro-
vidingaventfor“surplus”domesticproductionandallowingtheexploi-
tation of scale economies through specialization since the division of
labor was seen as limited by the extent of the market. Yet he chose to em-
p h a s i z et h a tf r e et r a d ei se s s e n t i a lf o rt h em a x i m u md e v e l o p m e n to f
wealth for any nationbecause,through such trade,a variety of goods be-
comes possible. Ricardo notes that foreign trade “increases the amount
and variety of the objects on which revenue may be expended, and af-
fords, by the abundance and cheapness of commodities, incentives to
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the principal discoverer of the theory of comparative advantage, he thus
put more emphasis on benefit 1 than benefit 2. Later theories, such as the
Scandinavian theory of comparative advantage that was also based on
factor immobility and incomplete specialization as the normal outcome,
involved trade as a bringer of variety even less: the production function
specific to a good was assumed to be the same in all countries, but factor
endowmentratios,andhencethefactorcontentofgoodstraded,differed
between them.
The gist of all the classical distinctions is that “extensive” types of
goods involved in the expansion of trade are specially made and hence
new, based on technical and taste innovations, or firmly identified with
a geographic region that can produce them. Trade in “intensive” goods,
by contrast, involves standardized auction‐type goods readily available
and in continuous and habitual supply from several sources and in gen-
eral use.
III. Lost in Translation to Canned Data Categories
To implement their search for differential effects of exchange rate re-
gimes at the two margins, Bergin and Lin rely on a system of Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC)—af o u r –digit classification
ending in 2000. Adding proportionately more than competing suppliers
from other countries to existing exports within a four‐digit category
would expand trade at the intensive margin; exporting in more cate-
gories would boost trade at the extensive margin. To see whether such
a definition is economically meaningful requires looking into the con-
tent of the statistical categories. All these categories, except for unpro-
cessed foods, live animals, and crude materials, relate to manufactured
goods. They do not include services, which now account for two‐thirds
of personal consumption expenditures and the greatest increase in he-
donic variety. Only one of the 10 one‐digit SITC categories starting at
0—number 8, Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles—contains a high
proportion of finished consumer goods. Lower categories include inter-
mediate and capital goods traded between firms.
The SITC classification scheme does not establish categories that de-
serve to be called varieties or composite products in a hedonic sense but
uses quite different principles of grouping. For example, 8427 is the cat-
egory for blouses, shirts, and shirt‐blouses for women and girls of wo-
ven textile fabrics, while 8447 is for the same but of knitted or crocheted
textile fabrics. Growth at the extensive margin of trade thus would be
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blouses, not by providing a greater range of quality or variety of design.
So if a country that previously exported only blouses of woven fabric
started to export knitted blouses of the same design and intended for a
similar occasion, it would be expanding trade at the extensive margin
under Bergin and Lin’s measure. If the country instead started also to
export blouses of a stunning new design and for different occasions, but
still of woven fabric, it would expand trade at the intensive margin.
This example shows that whether trade is boosted inside a four‐digit
category or in different categories depends entirely on the configuration
of these boxes and does not relate to any distinguishing consumer or
producer economics that I can recognize. Certainly classical economics
would be more inclined to credit the design innovation with creating
benefits at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin, for it
would distinguish between the upscale trade that contributes to variety
and the downscale trade in basic, fairly standardized, goods contribut-
ing to abundance.
One more example to drive home the point: children’s toys is cate-
gory 8942, and 8947 is sporting goods. Assume that a firm that had spe-
cialized in exporting gloves and mittens used in sports (89477) decided
to apply its facility in working specialty fabrics to also manufacture out-
fitsandaccessoriesfordragons,dolls,andknightsforexport.Onceagain,
by entering the toy category in which the country had not exported be-
fore, it would expand trade at the extensive margin according to Bergin
and Lin’s measure.If the firminsteadhaddecidedto takeupthe produc-
tion of fishing rods (89471), an entirely unrelated new venture, it would
have increased trade at the intensive margin since the country was ex-
porting appreciably in the associated four‐digit category already before.
Hence, the more one looks into the categories, the less suitable they
appear to convey the “classical” or any other predictable economic con-
tent or difference that Bergin and Lin are seeking—or simply asserting
as if such a relevant difference did not first need to be constructed in the
categories they work with. Contrary to what Bergin and Lin presume,
many different goods are bunched together in four‐digit categories ac-
cording to noneconomic and incoherent principles of classification.
Hence, innovation and augmentation of variety in exports can occur
within, as well as between, SITC categories without obvious distinction.
Depending on what theme researchers pursue, they must first obtain
a relevant grouping of goods. Grouping criteria might include R&D
and factor intensity or might serve to distinguish knowledge goods,
IPR‐protected goods, ICT goods, design‐intensive goods, fashion
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goods, and standardized goods with ISO number, and so forth. Investi-
gatinghow variousdegrees ofintegrationand types ofregimesaffectthe
volumeanddistributionoftradeinsuchgoodsmayproveinsightful.For
instance, exchangerate regimescould beamongthe factors that differen-
tially affect the growth of exports by such industry characteristics. If so,
this might give a clue to why such regimes matter for the structure of ex-
portgrowth.Suchastructuredapproachwouldavoidpressingeconomic
interpretations on exports expanding within and between SITC product
categories that these categories cannot support.
There are at least three other match‐up problems between economic
theory and data:
a. Bergin and Lin’s model variety refers only to finished consumer
goods and their “AL” (a nod to the labor theory of value?) production
function does not take in semi‐finished inputs or capital. However, the
data used are not nearly so exclusive: both France and Germany, for
instance, export more capital goods than consumer goods, and the im-
port content of Germany’s export goods is 40%. Goods other than con-
sumer goods account for the lion’s share of the data and dominate the
results, but these are to be understood with a model not containing
such goods.
b. Classical economists did not consider fragmentation trade nor do
Bergin and Lin. Yet an explosion of such back‐and‐forth trade inside
Europe is likely to register as a big expansion of trade at the extensive
margin in the authors’ scheme. For the representative consumer in their
model, trade in more categories of components could add to variety





whose number is endogenously determined in the model, do not ap-
pear in the data. Berthou and Fontagné (2008, 15) estimate with French
firm data (collected at the HS‐8 level) that the market share of the 10%
largest exporters was 95% in the period 2000–2003. Hence, if French ex-
ports to country N become significant in additional categories, large es-
tablished firms already exporting in many categories to country N are
more likely to be involved than small firms exporting for the first time.
By dwelling on set‐up costs, Bergin and Lin imply the opposite. Discus-
sions of set‐up costs for entering foreign markets also do not distinguish
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higher productivity and quality), distribution (logistics), and final sales
abroad (retail outlets and marketing). Retail giants like Carrefour or
Wal‐Martandregionalproducercooperativesmediatebetweenthesmall
and the large by scaling up and cutting costs in the latter stages of the
export business. Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) estimates that, in 2005,
87.5% of German enterprises with an annual turnover of more than
€50 million were directly engaged in the export business but that only
10.5% of those with an annual turnover of less than €10 million were so
engaged.
IV. On Their Own Terms
I have gone beyond the Bergin and Lin paper in places. Taking the pa-
per on its own terms, there is more that can move the two margins of
export trade than the paper lets on. The operational definition used by
Bergin and Lin is to break country J’s export (JX) share in global exports
(GX) to country N, JXN/GXN, into two factors that are positive and not
greater than one. Only one additional variable is used in the denomi-
nator and the numerator of these margins: it is that subset of GXN, GX
[J]N, that consists of global exports to N in only those categories in
which J participates appreciably by some binary criterion. The multipli-
cative decomposition is
Export Share ¼ JXN=GXN ¼ð JXN=GX½J NÞð GX½J N=GXNÞ
¼ð Intensive MÞðExtensive MÞ: ð1Þ
Now any increase in J’s share of the value of global exports to N that
is due to improvement in the terms of trade in the categories in which J
exports to N would (under short‐run inelasticity of demand) raise JXN
and GX(J)N equiproportionately and by more than GXN. Such a devel-
opment would be credited mechanically to expansion at the extensive
margin, according to formula (1), as GX(J)N rises by a greater percent-
age than GXN. Also, under pricing‐to‐market (PTM), exchange‐rate
depreciation improves the terms of trade. Then, as the exchange rate
fluctuates, PTM could produce fluctuations at the extensive margin of
trade without signifying anything for“varieties.” Since no “new” trade
would be involved, clearly these assignments of the export share change
to the extensive margin would not correspond to the classical definition
at all.
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country N in all those categories in which it exports to N but total ex-
ports in these categories had simply grown faster than in the other ca-
tegories: Again, JXN would rise at the same rate as GX[J]N, leaving the
intensive margin unchanged, while GX[J]N would grow faster than
GXN, raising the extensive margin without increasing the number of
varieties consumed.
This leaves the case, the only one subsumed in Bergin’s discussion,
where GX[J]N/GXN rises because country J participates in more cate-
gories of global exports to country N. Here difficulties may be created
by Viner’s trade creation for Bergin and Lin’s interpretation. When pro-
duction of electronics such as home entertainment systems sold in the
U.S. market first shifted from the United States to Mexico on account of
gains in the competitiveness of using Mexico as an export platform un-
der NAFTA, there was an expansion at the extensive margin of Mexi-
co’s export trade with the United States. But variety in the U.S. market
did not increase; only costs fell. Trade in standardized components
tends to be directed, and quickly redirected, on the basis of cost effi-
ciency alone. Production and trade flows in differentiated products
are more entrenched.
V. Lessons from the Failure of Past Predictions and Persistent
Exchange Rate Errors
Research on the trade effects of a monetary union that is currently of
interest relates predominantly to the euro area. Yet it is already well
known thatdataforcurrencyunionscollectedbyRosemostlyforgroups
of small and frequently backward countries far away from Europe can-
not successfully be projected on euroland. Running regressions with
data that are dominated by Equatorial and sub‐Saharan countries has
produced egregious errors when the regression results were used to
predict the effects on the growth of trade within the euro zone. Outside
resource‐extraction investments, these African countries got little FDI
and were not part of a major regional, let alone global, supply chain.
Whatevertheyachievedfromaverylowstartingbaseunderacurrency
union has no conceivable relevance for the euro zone for lack of com-
parability of almost all transmission conditions. The euro is a major in-
ternational currency and the EMU (European Economic and Monetary
Union) isamonetaryunion,not justacurrencyunion.Currency unions
basedonaminorcurrencyareusuallysubjecttodollarization/euroization
in their financial business and trade contracts. They tend to have no pricing
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(balance ofpayment [BOP] crises) maywell have a strong effect on the ex-
tent of their tradewith other members ofthe union. Any resulting real de-
preciation of the common currency relative to the rest‐of‐world (ROW)
would divert imports from ROW to countries inside the union, thereby
strengthening trade between them (cf. Baldwin 2006, 44).
Rose and van Wincoop (2001, 389), managed to whittle Rose’s earlier
prediction of the trade‐creating effect of currency union down to 58%
fortheeurolandmembersofthattime.Thiswasstillseveraltimesgreater
than the range of 5%–10% (up to twice as much in the long run) actually
found by Baldwin (2006, 48) when he evaluated the evidence that had
emerged for the euro zone in the meantime. Simply adding observations
for the euro‐area countries to the Rose data would yield a blend of two
very different effects fitting neither African and other such currency
union countries nor the euro zone.
To analyze data on the development of the intensive and extensive
margins of trade in the euro zone in fixed physical categories, one
should start with data for Europe and not for the Central African Re-
public (population 4.5 million), neighboring Chad (10 million), or other
frequently troubled and financially backward countries. Their names
appear in the list of 65 pairs of currency union countries for Bergin
and Lin’s estimation period 1973–2000. Berthou and Fontagné (2008)
and several contributions analyzed in Baldwin (2006) have pointed
the way in using European data for Europe’s one‐of‐a‐kind experiment.
That experiment has created a monetary union over an area of great
and diversified trading power, with increasingly integrated banking, fi-
nance, and goods and services markets. The technical, regulatory, and
legal infrastructure required for such integration is largely in place.
Mini–money currency unions in Africa and elsewhere can only contrib-
ute sample abnormalities leading to error in predicting the trade conse-
quences of EMU.
There can be no doubt that exchange rate regimes and the economic
size and level of development of the area they cover matter for the ex-
pansion of trade and the location of FDI (see Ethier 1998). The reason is
that these regimes also affect the extent and depth of financial integra-
tion and the long‐term predictability of real exchange rates among the
members of that regime. However, in Bergin and Lin’s model, the real
exchange rate expected in year t for any future year after t is known and
constant as prices are free to adjust to any money supply shocks after
1 year. Modeling each bilateral exchange rate as a deterministic function
of the ratio of the corresponding money supplies is a throwback to the
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provides no room for exchange rate uncertainty per se. Rather, random
disturbances in money supplies—which could be neutralized by simply
fixing the exchange rate so as to endogenize the money supply of the
stabilizing party—in Bergin and Lin’s model cause only temporary dis-
turbances of the real exchange rate under for‐the‐year‐ahead price set-
ting if these disturbances are allowed to stand. Even if the government
accepts the consequences of stochastic money supply shocks for ex-
changerates,commoninflationtargeting“assumingfullsymmetryacross
countries” would seem to guarantee a very close approximation to equi-
libriumwhencombinedwithanyexchangerateregimeinthemonetarist
model. Indeed, meaningful differences in exchange rate regimes would
cease to exist if exchange rates were tethered to relative money stocks as
Bergin and Lin specify.
If real exchange rate fluctuations, under floating, were indeed just
high‐frequency random flurries attributable to a single known cause,
that is, loose money supply control, they would average out over time,
be easy to hedge in major currencies, and be among the least of worries
for business. It is only prolonged deviations of the real exchange rate
from what was, and reasonably could have been, expected that causes
trouble for decisions to go into foreign markets through either foreign
establishment or through developing cross‐border trade. By not provid-
ing for the risk of real exchange rate deviations correcting only slowly,
Bergin and Lin’s model does not adequately support the subject matter
of his paper, just as the data do not serve to implement his model in
other respects. But then who ever said that a fine paper has to get every-
thing right?
Endnote
The author was program director of economics at the National Science Foundation
through 2008 when this comment was written, but the views expressed are his own
and not those of NSF.
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